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Blind quantum computing [A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, and E. Kashefi, Proceedings of the 50th
Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 517 (2009)] is a secure cloud quantum
computing protocol which enables a client (who does not have enough quantum technology at her
disposal) to delegate her quantum computation to a server (who has a universal quantum computer)
without leaking any relevant information to the server. In [T. Morimae and K. Fujii, Phys. Rev.
A 87, 050301(R) (2013)], a new blind quantum computing protocol, so called the measuring-Alice
protocol, was proposed. This protocol offers several advantages over previous protocols, such as
the device-independent security, less demanding requirements for the client, and a simpler and
stronger security based on the no-signaling principle. In this paper, we show composable security of
the measuring-Alice protocol by using the formalism of the constructive cryptography [U. Maurer,
Proceedings of Theory of Security and Applications, TOSCA 2011, pages 33-56. Springer (2011) ].
The above advantages of measuring-Alice protocol enable more intuitive and transparent proofs for
the composable security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A first generation quantum computer will be expensive
and high-maintenance, and therefore will be implemented
in a “cloud” style like today’s supercomputers. In such
a cloud quantum computing, the most important prob-
lem is to guarantee the client’s privacy. Blind quantum
computation [1–11] is a new secure quantum computing
protocol which can protect the security of client’s privacy
in such a cloud quantum computing. Protocols of blind
quantum computation enable a client (Alice), who does
not have enough quantum technologies at her disposal,
to delegate her quantum computation to a server (Bob),
who has a full-fledged quantum computer, in such a way
that Alice’s input, output, and program are hidden to
Bob [1–11].
An unconditionally secure protocol of blind quantum
computation with almost classical Alice was first pro-
posed by Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi (BFK) [1].
Their protocol uses measurement-based quantum com-
putation (MBQC) on the cluster state (graph state) by
Raussendorf and Briegel [12]. A proof-of-principle ex-
periment of the BFK protocol has also been achieved
recently with a quantum optical system [3]. The BFK
protocol has been generalized to other blind quan-
tum computing protocols which use MBQC on the
Affleck-Kennedy-Lieb-Tasaki (AKLT) state [5, 13, 14],
continuous-variable MBQC [7, 15], topological MBQC [6,
16], and the ancilla-driven model [10, 17].
In these BFK-based protocols, Alice has to possess
a device which emits randomly-rotated single-particle
states, such as single-photon states. If Alice’s device
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is not perfect, and sometimes wrongly emits more than
two photons, extra photons can be exploited by malicious
Bob to learn Alice’s information, by using, for example,
the photon number splitting attack [18–21]. Therefore,
it is necessary for Alice to precisely control the number
of emitted photons, which is not easy with today’s tech-
nology.
In Ref. [9], a complementary protocol of the BFK-type
protocol, so called measuring-Alice (MA) protocol, was
proposed by Morimae and Fujii. In this protocol, Al-
ice has only to perform measurements in stead of state
preparations. These measurements are not necessary to
be single-photon measurements: they can be polarization
measurements with a threshold detector. Since a polar-
ization measurement with a threshold detector is much
easier than a creation of a single-photon state, MA pro-
tocol eases Alice’s burden. Furthermore, as is shown in
Ref. [9], this protocol offers the device-independent secu-
rity for Alice, which means that Alice does not need to
trust her device: even if Alice’s device does not work cor-
rectly, Bob cannot learn Alice’s information. Finally, it
was shown [9] that the security of MA protocol is based
on the no-signaling principle, which is more fundamental
than quantum physics [22]. Because of the no-signaling
principle, the proof of the security of MA protocol be-
comes very simple.
If Bob cannot learn anything about Alice’s computa-
tion whatever he does, we say that the protocol offers
“blindness” [1–11]. (Here, we ignore unavoidable leakage
of trivial information, such as the upper bound of the
computational size, or whether Alice’s output is classi-
cal or quantum, etc. [1–11].) In fact, all BFK-type blind
protocols and MA protocol satisfy the blindness.
The “verifiability” is another important concept in
could quantum computing. The verifiability means that
Alice can check whether Bob is following the correct pro-
tocol. If malicious Bob deviates from the correct proto-
2col, the verifiability enables Alice to detect it with high
probability, and therefore the probability for Alice of ac-
cepting a wrong result can be exponentially small. Fitzsi-
mons and Kashefi (FK) recently introduced a modified
version of the BFK protocol which satisfies the verifia-
bility [2]. The verifiability of MA protocol was shown in
Ref. [8].
However, all previous results (except for Ref. [11]) con-
sider only stand-alone security. The stand-alone security
means that the protocol is secure during a single execu-
tion of it in an isolated environment. The stand-alone
security is often proven by showing that the mutual in-
formation between honest party and malicious party is
exponentially small.
The stand-alone security establishes the security of a
protocol as a primitive, and often gives important in-
sights for deep understanding of protocols. Therefore, it
is a first goal to show the stand-alone security of a cryp-
tographic protocol. However, the stand-alone security is
not sufficient if we consider a protocol in a broader and
hence more realistic scenario. For example, the (stand-
alone) unconditional security of the quantum key distri-
bution protocol (QKD) [23, 24] has been proven by many
researchers by showing that the accessible information is
exponentially small. Here, the accessible information is
the mutual information between the distributed key and
the outcome of an optimal measurement on the adver-
sary’s system. However, it was pointed out in Ref. [25]
that even if the accessible information is small, the key
might not be enough secure if it is used in another pro-
tocol, such as the one-time pad encryption, due to the
locking [26], which is a purely non-classical property.
If we want to guarantee the security of a protocol in
such a broader context, we have to show the compos-
able security [27, 28, 30–36]. The composable security
means the security of a primitive protocol in a general
environment. For example, a protocol is secure even if it
is used many times as subroutines of a larger protocol.
The composable security of QKD was shown in Ref. [36].
The composable security of the key recycling in authen-
tication was studied in Ref. [37].
The composable security of the BFK-type protocols
were studied in Ref. [11]. They showed the composable
blindness of the BFK protocol and the composable blind-
verifiability of the FK protocol by using the constructive
cryptography [27, 28]. Although the composable security
of MA protocol was also studied in Ref. [11], it is not suf-
ficient, since they showed only the composable blindness:
the composable device-independent blindness, which is a
new feature of MA protocol, was not shown. Further-
more, the composable blind-verifiability of MA protocol
was neither considered.
In this paper, we study the composable security of MA
protocol. For that purpose, we utilize the framework of
the constructive cryptography [27, 28]. We will introduce
two types of MA protocols, one is without verification
and the other is with verification, and will show the com-
posable security of them. Hence, the device-independent
blindness and the verifiability of MA protocol are shown
to be composable. We will see that our proofs of the com-
posable security are much simpler than those of BFK
type protocols due to the simplicity of the stand-alone
security of MA protocol based on the no-signaling prin-
ciple.
This paper is organized as follows. We will first
review some necessary backgrounds, including the no-
signaling principle (Sec. II), MBQC (Sec. III), MA pro-
tocol (Sec. IV), and the constructive cryptography and
the composable security (Sec. V). We will then show our
results in Sec. VI and Sec. VII. The discussion is given
in Sec. VIII.
II. NO-SIGNALING PRINCIPLE
No-signaling principle is one of the most fundamental
principles in physics, and quantum theory also respects
it. Formally, it is explained as follows. Let us assume
that Alice and Bob share a physical system, which might
be classical, quantum, or even super-quantum (Fig. 1).
For example, Alice and Bob share the Bell pair,
1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B),
where the subscript A (B) indicates Alice (Bob) possesses
the qubit.
As is shown in Fig. 1, Alice chooses her measurement
parameter x (such as the measurement angles of a spin),
and performs measurement. She obtains the result a.
Bob also chooses his measurement parameter y, and per-
forms measurement. He obtains the result b. The no-
signaling principle (from Alice to Bob) is defined by
P (b|x, y) = P (b|x′, y) (1)
for all b, x, x′, and y, where P (α|β) is the conditional
probability distribution of α given β. Equation (1) means
that the change of Alice’s measurement parameter does
not affect the probability distribution of Bob’s measure-
ment result. In other words, the shared system cannot
transmit any message from Alice to Bob.
Alice Bob
x
a
y
b
FIG. 1: The no-signaling principle. Alice and Bob share a
system.
Interestingly, the no-signaling principle is more funda-
mental than quantum theory in the sense that there is
a theory which is more non-local than quantum theory,
but respects the no-signaling principle [22].
3III. MEASUREMENT-BASED QUANTUM
COMPUTING
In this section, we will review the basics of
measurement-based quantum computing (MBQC) [12].
Readers who are familiar with it can skip this section.
MBQC is a new model of quantum computation whose
computational power is equivalent to the traditional
circuit model. In MBQC, we first prepare a highly-
entangledN qubit (or more generally, qudit) state, which
we call the resource state. We next perform measurement
of each qubit. The measurement angle of a qubit depends
on the results of the previous measurements. If the re-
source state is a universal resource state, we can simulate
any quantum circuit with the adaptive local measure-
ments.
A canonical example of universal resource states is the
cluster state [12]:
(
⊗
(i,j)
CZi,j)|+〉⊗N ,
where |+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉), N qubits are allocated on sites
of the two-dimensional square lattice,
CZi,j ≡ |0〉〈0|i ⊗ Ij + |1〉〈1|i ⊗ Zj
is the controlled-Z gate between ith qubit and jth qubit,
and (i, j) is a pair of nearest-neighbour sites. Here, Ij is
the identity operator acting on jth qubit, and Zj is the
Pauli Z operator acting on jth qubit.
Let us see Fig. 2. We first prepare the cluster state
(Fig. 2 (a)). We then perform local adaptive measure-
ments (Figs. 2 (b) and (c)). By changing measurement
angles, we can generate any state U |+〉⊗N on the last
layer of the cluster state (Fig. 2 (d)), where U is any N -
qubit unitary operator. (Actually, what we create on the
last layer is
( N⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
)
U |+〉⊗N ,
where xj , zj ∈ {0, 1} are random binaries. We call⊗N
j=1X
xj
j Z
zj
j the byproduct, and we say that we can im-
plement U |+〉⊗N up to a byproduct. Since xj , zj are de-
termined by measurement results, we can correct byprod-
uct. )
IV. MEASURING ALICE PROTOCOL
In this section, we will review MA protocol [8, 9]. Let
ρin and U be the input and the program (unitary op-
eration) of Alice’s computation, respectively. In other
words, Alice wants to implement U on ρin, and obtain
UρinU
†. If Alice’s input is classical, i.e., she knows the
classical description of the input quantum state ρin, or
her input is a classical data, she does not need to start
(a) (b) (c) (d)
U|+...+
FIG. 2: The measurement-based quantum computing with
the cluster state.
with ρin: she can start with the standard state, such as
|0〉⊗n, which is prepared by Bob, and the preparation of
the initial state can be included in U .
Bellow, we will introduce two MA protocols. We will
first explain a simpler one: a protocol without the ver-
ification. We will next explain a protocol with verifica-
tion. These two protocols satisfy the device-independent
blindness. Note that the device-independent verifiability
is not guaranteed in the second protocol, because, as we
will see later, the device-independent verifiability is im-
possible: a malicious device can always cheat Alice by
pretending that all tests are passed.
A. Protocol without verification
Let us consider MBQC between two parties, Alice and
Bob (Fig. 3): Bob first prepares a resource state |g〉,
such as the cluster state, in his laboratory (Fig. 3 (a)).
He next sends each particle to Alice one by one, and
Alice measures each particle in a certain angle which is
determined by her program U (Fig. 3 (b)). The program
is kept secret to Bob.
If Bob behaves honestly, i.e., generates the correct
resource state and sends each particle correctly, the
last layer of his resource state becomes UρinU
† (up to
byproducts) (Fig. 3 (c)). If Bob sends it to Alice, Alice
can obtain the correct quantum outcome (or if she needs
the classical outcome, she can obtain the correct result
by measuring it).
Since there is no message transmission from Alice to
Bob, the no-signaling principle guarantees that Bob can-
not learn anything about Alice’s input, measurement an-
gles (i.e., program), and outputs, whatever he does on his
system [8, 9]. (As we said, we ignore trivial leakage of
Alice’s information. In this case, Bob can know the up-
per bound of the size of Alice’s MBQC, since he creates
the resource state.)
This protocol also satisfies the device-independent
blindness, which means that whatever Alice’s device
does, Bob cannot learn Alice’s secret. This is again
shown by using the no-signaling principle: due to the
no-signaling principle, Alice cannot send any message to
Bob whatever she does. Therefore, even if her measur-
ing device does not work correctly, Bob cannot gain any
4information about Alice’s secret [8, 9, 29].
Alice
(a)
Bob
Alice
(b)
Bob
Alice
(c)
Bob
Uρ  U
in
†
g
FIG. 3: MA protocol without verification. (a) Bob prepares
a resource state. If he is honest, he creates |g〉. If he is
malicious, he might create completely different state. (b) He
sends each particle to Alice one by one. Alice measures each
particle according to her program. (c) The last layer of Bob’s
resource state is UρinU
† (up to byproduct) if he is honest.
B. Protocol with verification
The above protocol does not satisfy the verifiability.
In other words, if Bob behaves maliciously, Alice accepts
a wrong result although Bob cannot learn Alice’s secret.
In order to achieve the verifiability, we modify the above
protocol in the following manner.
Let us define the N -qubit state
|ΨP 〉 ≡ P
(
|g〉 ⊗ |+〉⊗N/3 ⊗ |0〉⊗N/3
)
,
where |g〉 is an N3 -qubit universal resource state for
MBQC, |+〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and P is an N -qubit per-
mutation, which keeps the order of qubits in |g〉. (Since
Alice does not have any quantum memory, the order of
particles in |g〉 should not be permutated.) This permu-
tation is randomly chosen by Alice and kept secret to
Bob.
Bob prepares a sufficiently large universal resource
state |G〉 in his laboratory (Fig. 4 (a)). He sends each
qubit of it to Alice one by one, and Alice measures each
qubit (Fig. 4 (b)) until she creates the N -qubit state
σq|ΨP 〉 in Bob’s laboratory, where
σq ≡
N⊗
j=1
X
xj
j Z
zj
j
with q ≡ (x1, ..., xN , z1, ..., zN ) ∈ {0, 1}2N is the byprod-
uct of MBQC [12] (Fig. 4 (c)). Here, Xj and Zj are Pauli
operators acting on jth qubit. Throughout this paper,
we assume that there is no communication channel from
Alice to Bob. Then, due to the no-signaling principle,
Bob cannot learn anything about q and P [9]. If Bob
can learn something about P , Alice can transmit some
message to Bob by encoding her message into P , which
contradicts to the no-signaling principle. Furthermore, if
Bob can learn something about q, Alice can exploit this
fact to transmit her message to Bob.
Bob sends each qubit of σq|ΨP 〉 to Alice one by one,
and Alice does MBQC on σq|ΨP 〉 with correcting σq
(Fig. 4 (d)). This means that before measuring jth
qubit of σq|ΨP 〉 she applies σ†q |j on jth qubit, where
σ†q |j is the restriction of σ†q on jth qubit. For exam-
ple, (I ⊗XZ ⊗ Z)|2 = XZ. Qubits belonging to |g〉 are
used for MBQC to realize the unitary U on the input
ρin. Note that this computation is done with a quantum
error correcting code with the code distance d. States
|0〉 and |+〉 are used as “traps” [2]. In other words, she
measures Z on |0〉 and X on |+〉, and if she obtains a
minus result, she rejects the result of the computation.
If results are plus for all traps, she accepts the result of
the computation.
If malicious Bob wants to deviate from the above pro-
tocol, he might apply some operations on his system, or
even he generates completely different state G′ in stead
of |G〉. In this case, he changes traps with high prob-
ability, since he does not know the place of traps. In
particular, if Bob wants to change the logical qubit of
Alice’s computation, he has to access at least d qubits,
which increases the probability of changing traps. It was
shown in Ref. [8] that the probability that the logical
state is changed and no trap is flipped is at most
(
2
3
) d
3 ,
where d is the distance of the quantum error correcting
code. In other words, the probability that Alice accepts
a wrong result is exponentially small in d. (By doing the
concatenation, d can be any large integer. In particular,
it can be sufficiently large for a given security parameter
ǫ, which is introduced later.) In this way, the verifiability
is achieved in MA protocol.
This protocol also satisfies the device-independent
blindness due to the no-signaling principle. However,
note that the device-independent verifiability is not sat-
isfied, because a malicious device can always cheat Alice
by outputting plus results for all trap tests.
V. COMPOSABLE SECURITY
In this section, we will explain the basics of the
composable security [27, 28, 30–36] concentrating on
5Alice
(a)
Bob
Alice
(b)
Bob
Alice
(c)
Bob
G
σ   Ψq P
Alice
(d)
Bob
FIG. 4: MA protocol with verification. (a) Bob prepares
a resource state. If he is honest, he creates |G〉. If he is
malicious, he might create a completely different state. (b)
He sends each particle to Alice one by one. Alice measures
each particle to create σq|ΨP 〉. (c) The last layer of Bob’s
resource state is σq|ΨP 〉 if he is honest. (d) Bob sends each
particle to Alice one by one. Alice measures each particle to
perform computation and to test traps.
our setup, namely two-party protocols with one always-
honest client, Alice, and one possibly-malicious server,
Bob. Although we will use the constructive cryptogra-
phy [27, 28], similar results may be obtained in the frame-
work of Ref. [32, 33].
In the framework of the constructive cryptography [27,
28], a protocol π is represented by an engine which has
input and output ports, and performs some functionality.
Protocols implement (approximate) the ideal functional-
ity S by using a resource R. The ideal functionality S
has a switch, f : f = 0 corresponds to honest Bob and
f = 1 corresponds to malicious Bob.
For example, as is shown in Fig. 5 (a), Alice’s protocol
πA and Bob’s protocol πB interact (exchange inputs and
outputs) with the resourceR. If the combination πARπB,
which is considered as a new resource, is ǫ-close to Sf=0,
πARπB ≈ǫ Sf=0, (2)
we say that πA, πB, and R are ǫ-composable correct. (We
will see later why we say “composable”.) Here, ǫ-close is
defined by the diamond-norm as
max
ρ
‖(I ⊗ πARπB)ρ− (I ⊗ Sf=0)ρ‖tr ≤ ǫ,
where ‖O‖tr is the trace norm of an operator O, and
we assume that all inputs and outputs of πARπB and S
are quantum states. (Classical information is encoded in
orthogonal quantum states.)
On the other hand, as is shown in Fig. 5 (b), if there
exists an engine σ, which we call a simulator, such that
πAR is ǫ-close to Sσ,
πAR ≈ǫ Sσ, (3)
we say that πA and R are ǫ-composable secure. (We will
see later why we say “composable”.) Again, the ǫ-close
means
max
ρ
‖(I ⊗ πAR)ρ− (I ⊗ Sσ)ρ‖tr ≤ ǫ,
where we assume that all inputs and outputs of πAR and
Sσ are quantum states.
R
πA πB(a)
(b)
~
~
ε
S
f=0
R
πA
~
~
ε
S
σ
FIG. 5: (a) A resource R and protocols piA and piB. (b) An
ideal functionality S and a simulator σ.
Equation (3) has two very important meanings.
Firstly, it gives a clear definition of security: it is a close-
ness of the real protocol to the ideal functionality. Sec-
ondly, as we will explain later, it also guarantees the se-
cure composition of the protocol.
Let us first explain why Eq. (3) defines the security. As
is shown in Fig. 6, Eq. (3) suggests that the environment
(distinguisher), which interacts with πAR or Sσ, cannot
distinguish πAR and Sσ within ǫ. Equation (3) also sug-
gests that for any attack D by the distinguisher against
πAR, there exists an attack Dσ against S which causes
the same effects to the distinguisher within ǫ. Therefore,
if πAR is not secure against an attack D, S is insecure
against the attackDσ, since the distinguisher cannot dis-
tinguish πAR and Sσ (what the distinguisher gains are
the same). However, it contradicts to the assumption
that S is secure against any attack. Therefore, πAR is
secure against any attack within ǫ.
6π
A
R
σ~
 
ε
D
S

FIG. 6: The illustration of Eq. (3).
Equation (3) also means another important concept,
the composable security. If we denote Eq. (3) by
R
πA,ǫ−−−→ S,
we can show (for a proof, see Appendix)
R
π,ǫ−−→ S and S π
′,ǫ′−−−→ T ⇒ R π
′◦π,ǫ+ǫ′−−−−−−→ T, (4)
R
π,ǫ−−→ S and R′ π
′,ǫ′−−−→ S′ ⇒ R‖R′ π|π
′,ǫ+ǫ′−−−−−−→ S‖S′.(5)
These equations mean the composability of the protocol.
A protocol might be secure if we use it only a single time
in an isolated environment. Such a security is called the
stand-alone security. However, if the protocol is used
in a subroutine of a larger protocol, the security of the
entire protocol is no longer guaranteed. The above two
equations guarantee the security in such a composable
setting.
Equation (4) means the following (Fig. 7). Let us as-
sume that we can realize an ideal functionality T by using
a protocol π′ and a resource S up to the error ǫ′. Further-
more, we also assume that the resource S can be realized
by using a protocol π and a resource R up to the error ǫ.
Then, we can realize T by using the composition π′ ◦ π
and R up to the error ǫ+ ǫ′.
π'  

ε
T
π π 
ε ε ε
+
FIG. 7: The illustration of Eq. (4).
Equation (5) means that if we run a protocol π up to
the error ǫ and a protocol π′ up to the error ǫ′ in parallel,
we can realize the ideal functionality S|S′ up to the error
ǫ+ ǫ′.
Now it is clear why we call Eq. (3) the “composable”
security. The composable correctness is also understood
in a similar way.
VI. COMPOSABLE SECURITY OF THE MA
PROTOCOL WITHOUT VERIFICATION
In this section, we will show our first result, the com-
posable security of the MA protocol without verification,
which was explained in Sec. IVA.
Alice’s protocol πA, Bob’s protocol πB, and the re-
source R (a one-way quantum channel) are illustrated in
Fig. 8. πA accepts
• the input ρin from the first port,
• the classical description [U ] of the program U from
the second port,
• the description w of the “behavior of Alice’s device”
from the fourth port,
• a state g′ from the fifth port (g′ = |g〉〈g| if Bob is
honest).
πB generates the resource state |g〉 of the measurement-
based quantum computation, and sends each qubit to πA
through R.
πA runs as follows.
1. If w = 0, Alice’s device works correctly. In other
words, πA performs MBQC with input ρin, pro-
gram [U ], and resource state g′. πA then outputs
the outcome ρout of the MBQC from the third port.
2. If w 6= 0, Alice’s device does some wrong behavior
specified by w. In this case, πA generates ρout ac-
cording to ρin, [U ], g
′, and w, and outputs it from
the third port.
πA
ρ
in
out
ρ
R πB
measurement
1
2
3
[U]
g
1
4
w
5
FIG. 8: Alice’s protocol piA, Bob’s protocol piB , and the
resource R (one-way quantum channel).
The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ are illus-
trated in Fig. 9. The filtered port (fifth port) is colored
in blue. σ sets f = 1, accepts a state g′ from the first
port, and outputs it from the second port.
S simulates πA in its inside. S runs as follows.
• S accepts the input ρin from its first port, and for-
wards it to the first port of the simulated πA.
7• S accepts the classical description [U ] of the pro-
gram U from its second port, and forwards it to the
second port of the simulated πA.
• S accepts w from its fourth port, and forwards it
to the fourth port of the simulated πA.
• If f = 0, S inputs |g〉 into the fifth port of the
simulated πA. If f = 1, S accepts a state g
′ from
the fifth port, and forwards it to the fifth port of
the simulated πA.
• S gets ρout from the third port of the simulated πA,
and outputs it from S’s third port.
f
	
ρ
i

[U]
ρ
out
σ
1
2
3
4
g'
g'
1
2
5
w
πA1
2
3
4
5
FIG. 9: The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ. S
simulates piA in its inside. The yellow circle means that the
element is not directly forwarded: if f = 0, |g〉 is input to the
fifth port of the simulated piA, whereas if f = 1 g
′ is forwarded
to the fifth port of the simulated piA.
Let us first check the correctness. If f = 0, S inputs
|g〉 into the fifth port of the simulated πA. It is equivalent
to the simulation of πARπB, since what RπB does is also
inputting |g〉 into the fifth port of πA. Therefore,
πARπB = Sf=0.
Hence we obtain the ǫ-composable correctness with ǫ = 0.
Next let us show the composable device-independent
blindness. What Sσ does is inputting a state g′ into the
fifth port of πA, which is equivalent to the work of πAR.
Therefore,
πAR = Sσ.
Hence we obtain the ǫ-composable device-independent
blindness with ǫ = 0.
VII. COMPOSABLE SECURITY OF MA
PROTOCOL WITH VERIFICATION
In this section, we show our second result, the compos-
able security of the MA protocol with verification, which
was explained in Sec. IVB.
Alice’s protocol πA, Bob’s protocol πB, and the re-
source R (a one-way quantum channel) are illustrated in
Fig. 10. πA accepts
• the input ρin of the computation from the first port,
• the classical description [U ] of the program from
the second port,
• the description w of the behavior of Alice’s device
from the fifth port,
• a state G′ from the sixth port (G′ = |G〉〈G| if Bob
is honest.)
Bob’s protocol πB generates the resource state |G〉 and
sends each particle to Alice one by one through R.
If w = 0, Alice’s device works correctly. In other words,
πA runs as follows.
1. πA generates a random N -qubit permutation P .
2. πA performs the MBQC MP on G′, where MP is
the MBQC such that σq|ΨP 〉 is generated if G′ =
|G〉〈G|.
4. πA performs the computation U on ρin by using
|g〉. If Bob is malicious, |g〉 might be different state,
and then U is not correctly implemented. πA also
checks all trap qubits.
5. If all traps pass the test, πA outputs e = 0 from
the fourth port. If at least one trap does not pass
the test, πA outputs e = 1 from the fourth port.
6. πA outputs the output ρout of the computation
from the third port. If Bob is honest, ρout =
UρinU
†. If he is malicious ρout might be different
state.
If w 6= 0, Alice’s device does some wrong behavior
specified by w. Then, πA runs as follows.
1. πA generates ρout and e according to ρin, [U ], G
′,
and w.
2. πA outputs ρout from the third port, and e from
the fourth port.
The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ are il-
lustrated in Fig. 11. The filtered port is colored in blue.
σ accepts a state G′ from the first port and outputs it
from the second port. σ switches f = 1.
S simulates πA in its inside. S runs as follows.
• S accepts the input ρin from its first port, and for-
wards it to the first port of the simulated πA.
• S accepts the program [U ] from its second port,
and forwards it to the second port of the simulated
πA.
• S accepts the description w from its fifth port, and
forwards it to the fifth port of the simulated πA.
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FIG. 10: Alice’s protocol piA, Bob’s protocol piB, and the
resource R (a one-way quantum channel).
• If f = 0, S inputs |G〉 into the sixth port of the
simulated πA. If f = 1, S accepts a state G
′ from
its sixth port, and forwards it to the sixth port of
the simulated πA.
• S gets e from the fourth port of the simulated πA,
and outputs it from S’s fourth port.
• S gets ρout from the third port of the simulated πA.
• If w 6= 0, S outputs ρout from S’s third port. If
w = 0, S works as follows:
– If e = 0, S outputs UρinU
† from S’s third
port.
– If e = 1, S outputs ρout from S’s third port.
Let us first show the correctness, Eq. (2). We first
consider the case w = 0. πARπB always outputs e = 0
and UρinU
†. On the other hand, Sf=0 inputs |G〉 into
the sixth port of the simulated πA. Then the simulated
πA always outputs e = 0 and UρinU
†. Because e = 0,
S always outputs UρinU
† from its third port. Therefore,
πARπB = Sf=0.
We next consider the case w 6= 0. In this case, the
output ρout from the third port of the simulated πA is
directly output from the third port of S. If f = 0, S
inputs |G〉 into the sixth port of the simulated πA, which
is equivalent to the work of RπB. Therefore, again we
have shown πARπB = Sf=0. In short, we have shown
the ǫ-composable correctness with ǫ = 0.
Now let’s move on to the security. Our goal is to show
Eq. (3). In the following, we will show that Eq. (3) is
satisfied for ǫ = 2δ, where δ is the exponentially small
probability that Alice accepts a wrong outcome in the
verifiable MA protocol.
A. w = 0
First let us assume w = 0. As is shown in Fig. 12, the
distinguisher prepares a system D, and divides it into
three subsystems, D = D1+D2 +D3. The distinguisher
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FIG. 11: The ideal functionality S and the simulator σ.
Yellow circles means that elements are not directly transfered:
there are filters.
inputs D1 into the first port of πA, and D2 into the first
port of R. The distinguisher also inputs [U ] into the
second port of πA. Let e0 and e1 are two orthogonal
states which represents e = 0 and e = 1, respectively. If
D2 = |G〉, πAR outputs
[
(UD1 ⊗ ID3 )TrD2(D)(U †D1 ⊗ ID3 )
]
⊗ e0,
where UD1 means U acts on D1, ID3 means I acts on D3,
and TrD2(D) means the partial trace of D over D2.
If D2 6= |G〉, πAR outputs
αη ⊗ e1 + δηerror ⊗ e0
+(1− α− δ)
[
(UD1 ⊗ ID3 )TrD2(D)(U †D1 ⊗ ID3 )
]
⊗ e0,
where η is a certain state which distinguisher gets if e = 1,
ηerror is the state which distinguisher gets when more
than d qubits of the resource state are affected by errors
during the computation, 0 < δ < 1 is an exponentially
small number, and 0 ≤ α < 1.
On the other hand, as is shown in Fig. 13, let us assume
that the distinguisher inputs D1 into the first port of S,
D2 into the first port of σ, and [U ] into the second port
of S. If D2 = |G〉, Sσ outputs
[
(UD1 ⊗ ID3 )TrD2(D)(U †D1 ⊗ ID3 )
]
⊗ e0.
If D2 6= |G〉, Sσ outputs
αη ⊗ e1
+(1− α)
[
(UD1 ⊗ ID3)TrD2(D)(U †D1 ⊗ ID3)
]
⊗ e0.
Therefore, the distance between πAR and Sσ is upper
bounded by
∥∥∥δηerror − δ(UD1 ⊗ ID3 )TrD2(D)(U †D1 ⊗ ID3)
∥∥∥
tr
≤ 2δ,
which shows Eq. (3) with ǫ = 2δ.
9B. w 6= 0
Next let us consider the case, w 6= 0. In this case,
the output ρout of the third port of the simulated πA is
directly output from the third port of S. Therefore, Sσ
works in the same way as πAR: πAR = Sσ.
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FIG. 12: How the distinguisher attacks against piAR.
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FIG. 13: How the distinguisher attacks against Sσ.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have shown the composable security
of the measuring Alice protocol by using the constructive
cryptography.
In Ref. [11], authors introduced the definition of the
stand-alone ǫ-blind verifiability, and showed it is equiv-
alent to the composable ǫ-blind verifiability (Theorem
5.3 of Ref. [11]). They also defined the stand-alone ǫ-
blindness, the stand-alone ǫ-verifiability, and the stand-
alone ǫ¯-independent ǫ-verifiability. They showed that the
stand-alone blindness and the independent verifiability
means the composable security (Lemma 6.6, Theorem
6.7, and Corollary 6.8). Since the FK protocol [2] sat-
isfies these individual stand-alone definitions, they con-
clude that FK protocol is composable secure (Appendix
C of Ref. [11]). It might be possible to show the com-
posable blind-verifiability of MA protocol by showing in
a similar way, i.e., first showing that MA protocol satis-
fies the above individual stand-alone definitions and then
use Theorem 6.7 of Ref. [11]. However, these individ-
ual definitions are introduced for the BFK-type setup,
i.e., Alice generates some states and exchanges quantum
states and classical messages between Bob. Therefore di-
rectly showing the composable security of MA protocol,
which we have done in this paper, seems to be easier and
more transparent. It would be a subject of future work
to investigate the relation between MA protocol and the
above individual stand-alone definitions.
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Appendix
For simplicity, we omit the identity operator I.
max
ρ
‖(π′πR)ρ− (Tσ′σ)ρ‖tr
= ‖(π′πR)η − (Tσ′σ)η‖tr
= ‖(π′πR)η − (π′Sσ)η + (π′Sσ)η − (Tσ′σ)η‖tr
≤ ‖(π′πR)η − (π′Sσ)η‖tr + ‖(π′Sσ)η − (Tσ′σ)η‖tr
= ‖E [(πR)η∗]− E [(Sσ)η∗]‖tr
+‖F [(π′S)η∗∗]−F [(Tσ′)η∗∗]‖tr
≤ ǫ+ ǫ′,
where η, η∗, and η∗∗ are certain states, and E and F are
certain CPTP maps. If we consider σ′σ as the simulator
for T , this shows Eq. (4).
max
ρ
‖(πR ⊗ π′R′)ρ− (Sσ ⊗ S′σ′)ρ‖tr
= ‖(πR⊗ π′R′)η − (Sσ ⊗ S′σ′)η‖tr
= ‖(πR⊗ π′R′)η − (πR ⊗ S′σ′)η
+(πR⊗ S′σ′)η − (Sσ ⊗ S′σ′)η‖tr
≤ ‖(πR⊗ π′R′)η − (πR ⊗ S′σ′)η‖tr
+‖(πR⊗ S′σ′)η − (Sσ ⊗ S′σ′)η‖tr
≤ ǫ′ + ǫ,
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where η is a certain state. This shows Eq. (5).
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